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The article deals with the issue of over-indebtedness, which is perceived – depending 
on the regulatory model adopted – either as a social problem or as a market failure. In 
this context, it is possible to distinguish between the welfare state (debtor oriented) and 
the liberal (creditors oriented) regulatory models. The comparative study of these 
paradigms is necessary for the following reasons: the comparison between the 
regulations of different countries makes it possible to find common rules to draw upon 
with a view to harmonization, as requested by the European Union; the comparison 
may reveal some regulatory gaps in those countries where the phenomenon of over-
indebtedness appears incessant; there are countries, such as Italy, in which the 
legislation, apparently hybrid and straddling the two different models, is the subject 
of current reflection by the legislator for a change. This research suggests that the 
Italian legislator could be better inspired by the solutions accepted elsewhere and 
stimulated, at the same time, to overcome the above-mentioned regulatory gaps. This 
comparison will also show how the original differences are decreasing and allow to 
imagine meeting points for common rules.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The persistent incapacity of individual debtors to meet their repayment 
obligations has generally been identified and interpreted, by legislative 
provisions designed to regulate the question, as a 'social problem'.1 In fact, 
many countries initially dealt with the problem of so-called over-
indebtedness not so much as an individual question, but as a collective 
phenomenon that had to be regulated by each nation's legal system.2 This 
                                                 
1 The social importance of the phenomenon is underlined by the European Economic 
and Social Committee in its Opinion on 'credit and social exclusion in an affluent 
society' (2008/C 44/19), published in the Official Journal of the European Union (OJ) 
of 16 February 2008, C44/74. This aspect has also been emphasised by Enza 
Pellecchia (ed), Dall'insolvenza al sovraindebitamento. Interesse del debitore alla liberazione 
e ristrutturazione dei debiti (Giappichelli 2012), XIII, who refers to the ancient origins 
of the phenomenon dating back to the agricultural crisis witnessed in Greece in the 
6th century B.C., which represented the opportunity for Solon to adopt social 
reforms at that time. 
2 According to the European Economic and Social Committee, over-indebtedness is 'a 
situation where the debtor is permanently incapable of paying his/her debts, or in 
which there is a real risk of not being able to pay debts when they become due'. 
According to the European Council (see Recommendation CM/Rec(2007)7 of the 
Committee of Ministers to Member States on legal solutions to debt problems 
(Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 20 June 2007 at the 999-a meeting of 
the Ministers' Deputies), over-indebtedness 'should cover at least the situations where 
the debt burden of an individual or a family continuously and/or manifestly exceeds 
its payment capacity, resulting in systematic difficulties, and sometimes in failure, in 
paying the creditors'. According to the wording adopted by the Italian legislator in 
Law no. 3 of 27 January 2012 (art. 6), sovraindebitamento is 'la situazione di perdurante 
squilibrio tra le obbligazioni assunte e il patrimonio prontamente liquidabile per farvi 
fronte, che determina la rilevante difficoltà di adempiere le proprie obbligazioni, 
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nation-level solution is adopted as an attempt to find a way of settling the 
financial crisis and designed to avoid the risk of the 'social exclusion' of those 
persons who finding themselves incapable of paying off their debts, no longer 
have any access to credit.3 
The nature of the problem, which is relevant in various ways, in itself justifies 
a multidisciplinary approach to the observation and examination of its 
specific aspects. The question appears not only to involve the non-legal 
sciences such as sociology, psychology and statistics, but also to be 
                                                 
ovvero la definitive incapacità di adempierle regolarmente' (a situation of a lasting 
imbalance between the obligations taken on and the capital that can be promptly 
converted to cash to deal with those obligations, resulting in considerable difficulty 
in meeting one's obligations, or the definitive incapacity to meet them regularly). As 
defined in German Law (§ 19 Insolvenzordnung), Überschuldung (also linked to business 
contexts) 'liegt vor, wenn das Vermögen des Schuldners die bestehenden 
Verbindlichkeiten nicht mehr deckt, es sei denn, die Fortführung des Unternehmens 
ist nach den Umständen überwiegend wahrscheinlich' (exists if the debtor's assets no 
longer cover the existing liabilities, unless, under the circumstances, the continuation 
of the company is largely probable). According to French law (L330-1 Code de la 
Consommation), la situation de surendettement des personnes physiques 'est caractérisée par 
l'impossibilité manifeste pour le débiteur de bonne foi de faire face à l'ensemble de 
ses dettes non professionnelles exigibles et à échoir. L'impossibilité manifeste pour 
une personne physique de bonne foi de faire face à l'engagement qu'elle a donné de 
cautionner ou d'acquitter solidairement la dette d'un entrepreneur individuel ou 
d'une société caractérise également une situation de surendettement. Le seul fait 
d'être propriétaire de sa résidence principale et que la valeur estimée de celle-ci à la 
date du dépôt du dossier de surendettement soit égale ou supérieure au montant de 
l'ensemble des dettes non professionnelles exigibles et à échoir ne peut être tenu 
comme empêchant que la situation de surendettement soit caractérisée' ('is 
characterized by the manifest impossibility for the bona fide debtor to meet all his 
non-business debts due and falling due. The manifest impossibility for a bona fide 
natural person to face up to the undertaking he has given to guarantee or jointly pay 
the debt of an individual entrepreneur or a company also characterizes an over-
indebtedness situation. The mere fact of owning one's principal residence and the 
fact that its estimated value at the date of submission of the over-indebtedness file is 
equal to or greater than the amount of all non-business debts due and payable cannot 
be held to prevent the over-indebtedness situation from being characterized as 
follows'). This and all subsequent translations are the author's own. 
3 In this regard, see the expression specifically used by the European Economic and 
Social Committee (see n 3).  
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interconnected, in terms of its legal character and its legislative 
consequences, with various notions of civil and business law. 
The strategies adopted by the different countries to govern the phenomenon 
fall within three different models of regulation: 
1) the consumer bankruptcy model, based, in general, on the debtor's 
limited liability, on the sharing of risks with creditors, on the social 
distribution of the cost of debt, and in particular on bankruptcy 
discharge seen as a means by which the debtor may be reintegrated 
into the economic world and the market as quickly as possible;  
2) the consumer debt adjustment model, based on the renegotiation of debts 
with creditors, in view of the approval of an overall repayment plan 
seen as an integral part of a project for the re-education of consumers 
and for the re-establishment of 'a morality of compliance';4 and  
3) the consumer bankruptcy and debt adjustment model, based on a 
compromise approach whereby the bankruptcy discharge outcome is 
provided for, however it is subjected to the occurrence of certain 
intervening events, or to the debtor meeting certain subjective or 
objective requirements of 'merit'. 
Upon closer examination, the features that distinguish the above-mentioned 
models from one another reflect the different approaches to the matter 
adopted by the respective legal systems. 
According to the liberal model of regulation (on which the consumer 
bankruptcy model is based, as in the USA), the aim of the system is market 
efficiency. The creditors and the debtor are treated as individual contracting 
parties, the bankruptcy discharge (i.e. write-off of prior-period debts) 
reduces risks and encourages new access to credit facilities and stimulates 
economically active behavior. This model incites a fresh start for the debtor 
after the default: hence, the debtor is reintegrated into economic activity and 
consumption as quickly as possible and his/her conduct is not stigmatized.   
In contrast, according to the welfare state model of regulation (on which the 
consumer debt adjustment model is based, as in Spain), the system aims to 
                                                 
4 This expression is borrowed from Pellecchia (n 1) 128. 
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safeguard the debtor against the onset of (further) social risks (illness, 
unemployment, etc.), albeit with a view to guaranteeing at least the partial 
settlement of creditors' claims.5 In this model, the debtor, if excessively over-
indebted, never deserves to be released from his/her obligations, even when 
they are the result of unforeseen circumstances. According to this model, a 
rescheduling of debts with creditors is desirable in order to gain the approval 
of a global repayment schedule. Advice and debt mediation services help 
debtors not to repeat the same mistakes and to change their consumption 
and debt patterns: the function of these services is decisive. 
Following the European Union's formulation of the urgent need for common 
rules and the establishment of a uniform paradigm, a comparative 
investigation appears necessary, because it is important to understand which 
model (or which alternative) can best balance the interests at stake. As early 
as the 1990s, the first study, completed in 1994 (Huls-Reifner-Bourgoinie, 
Overindebtedness of Consumers in the EC Member States: Facts and Search for 
Solutions), highlighted the problem of a lack of legislative harmonization at a 
European level, resulting in inequality, social injustice and failure to complete 
the internal market. Subsequently, in 2002, the Economic and Social 
Committee, in expressing its opinion on the subject Household over-
indebtedness, made it clear that the issue of over-indebtedness had been 
included as a priority in the development of consumer protection policy. The 
studies promoted over time by the European Commission have increasingly 
highlighted the urgent need for common regulations and have also affirmed 
the need for a strategy based on the joint use of preventative and subsequent 
actions.6 Furthermore, the 2008 opinion of the European Economic and 
Social Committee on Credit and social exclusion in an affluent society highlighted 
the need to draw up harmonized measures to anticipate and prevent this 
phenomenon. In this regard, two directives have recently been issued by the 
European Parliament and the Council: Directive 2008/48/EC on credit 
agreements for consumers and Directive 2014/17/EU on credit agreements 
for consumers relating to residential immovable property. Furthermore, the 
                                                 
5 With regard to this dichotomy, see Pellecchia (n 1), XIII. 
6 Over time, there has been a succession of working groups: see, among others, the 
working group on Inclusion, Social Policy Aspects of Migration, Streamlining of Social 
Policies. 
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search for common rules seems important in order to avoid, or at least reduce, 
the risk of bankruptcy tourism, a particular form of forum shopping, which 
may result from uneven legislation between the various countries.7 EU 
Regulation 2015/848 of the European Parliament and of the Council, dealing 
with this subject, has been adopted. In particular, the Regulation governs 
insolvency proceedings having cross-border effects. The purpose is to 
establish rules on jurisdiction, recognition and applicable law in this area. 
This Regulation enables the main insolvency proceedings to be opened in the 
Member State where the debtor has the center of his/her main interests. 
Those proceedings have a universal scope and are aimed at encompassing all 
the debtor's assets. To protect the diversity of interests, this Regulation 
permits secondary insolvency proceedings to be opened to run in parallel 
with the main ones. Secondary insolvency proceedings may be opened in the 
Member State where the debtor has an establishment. The effects of 
secondary insolvency proceedings are limited to the assets located in that 
State. 
In addition, comparative research seems particularly appropriate in view of 
the fact that there are some countries, such as Italy, in which the discipline 
on insolvency law is in the process of being amended. At the moment, Italian 
legislation in this area enshrines a compromise between the models (liberal 
and welfare state) described above. The Italian legal system seems to move 
along both trajectories traced by these two models.8 In fact, the above-
                                                 
7 Bankruptcy tourism is the phenomenon whereby residents of one country move to 
another jurisdiction in order to declare a personal bankruptcy there, before returning 
to their original country of residence. This is done in order to facilitate bankruptcy in 
a new jurisdiction where the insolvency laws are deemed to be more favorable. For a 
discussion on the phenomenon of bankruptcy tourism see Bob Wessels (ed), 
International Insolvency Law (Kluwer Law Intl. 2012), 349; Alberto Mazzoni, 'Cross-
border insolvency of multinational groups of companies: proposals for a European 
approach in the light of the UNCITRAL approach' [2010] Diritto del commercio 
internazionale 755; Piervincenzo Pacileo (ed), Il sovraindebitamento del debitore civile. 
Analisi comparata dei principali modelli europei (Giappichelli 2018) 49. 
8 Italian Law no. 3 of 27 January 2012 containing 'provisions governing usury and 
extortion, and also settlement of the over-indebtedness crisis', as supplemented by 
Decree Law no. 179 of 18 October 2012, converted, with amendments, by Italian Law 
no. 221 of 17 December 2012. The law under examination is the result of a debate that 
went on for some considerable time in the Italian Parliament, and that was triggered 
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mentioned Italian legislation is based on the distinction between the 
financial distress of a generalized 'non-bankruptable' debtor (i.e. an 
individual or business debtor, who is not a bankrupt commercial 
entrepreneur) and the consumer's financial distress. The consequent 
provision (see Articles 12-bis and seq. Law no. 3/2012) of separate (further) 
rules governing the latter may be read in two different ways. On the one hand, 
this distinction seems to lean towards the liberal model: the provision of a 
specific procedure for consumers suggests that they merit the application of 
ad hoc rules in the event of over-indebtedness, so that they may go back, as 
quickly as possible, to feeding the system of supply and demand. In fact, there 
appears to be a correspondence between the consumer and the market, 
insofar as the former exists, as part of the production and consumption chain 
that forms the basis for (and is substantiated in) the market.9 On the other 
hand, the distinction appears to lead towards the welfare state model: the 
provision of specific information in the report drafted by the body settling 
the crisis that accompanies the proposed restructured repayment schedule 
(see Article 17 Law no. 3/2012), indicates that the legislator pays particular 
attention to those debtors who find themselves incapable of meeting their 
financial obligations insofar as they have been victims of events beyond their 
control. The causes of indebtedness and the diligence employed by the 
consumer in freely taking on the financial obligations in question, and the 
reasons for the consumer's incapacity to fulfil such obligations, as well as the 
report on that consumer's solvency over the last five years must be made 
explicit. The comparative study is therefore important for at least three 
reasons. 
                                                 
by the ('Centaro') Bill passed by the Senate on 1 April 2009, then subsequently 
deposited with the Chamber of Deputies for a considerable time, and prior to that by 
the so-called 'Trevisanato' Bill of 28 February 2004 regarding the reform of 
insolvency procedures. On this matter, see Paolo Porreca, 'L'insolvenza civile', in 
Antonio Didone (ed), Riforme della legge fallimentare (Utet 2009), 2081; Fabrizio Di 
Marzio, 'Sulla composizione negoziale delle crisi da sovraindebitamento (note a 
margine dell'AC n. 2364)' [2010] Diritto fallimentare 659; Fabrizio Maimeri, 'Il 
quadro comunitario e le proposte italiane sul sovraindebitamento delle persone 
fisiche' [2004] Analisi giuridica dell'economia 421. 
9 This is what is deduced from the report accompanying Italian Decree Law no. 
179/2012, in which the legislator's aim is specifically stated as being to provide an 
incentive for development in support of consumer demand.  
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First of all, the comparison between the regulations of different countries 
makes it possible to find common rules to draw upon with a view towards 
harmonization. Secondly, the comparison may reveal some regulatory gaps in 
those countries where the phenomenon of over-indebtedness appears 
incessant. Thirdly, there are countries, such as Italy, in which the legislation, 
apparently hybrid and straddling the two different models, is the subject of 
current reflection by the legislator for a change. In making the required 
changes, the legislator could be better inspired by solutions accepted 
elsewhere and stimulated, at the same time, to overcome the above-
mentioned regulatory gaps. In other words, the ideas coming from the 
comparative analysis could lead the legislator to build a discipline that 
combines the solutions considered more efficient elsewhere and/or that 
closes the gaps found. For this reason, given that Italy is currently in the 
process of drafting its new regulatory framework, the Italian example will be 
the subject of more in-depth analysis in this article. In addition to the Italian 
model, the regulations of the United States, United Kingdom, Spain, France, 
Germany, Denmark and Sweden will be briefly analyzed. The choice to 
examine the regulatory systems of these countries is justified in a twofold 
perspective. First, it compares traditionally debtor-oriented models (such as 
the United States and the United Kingdom) with traditionally creditor-
oriented models (such as France, Spain, Germany, Denmark and Sweden): 
this comparison will show how the original differences are decreasing and it 
will therefore be possible to imagine meeting points for common rules, also 
in the light of the regulatory gaps that will emerge. Second, the choice made 
in Italy, while still undergoing reform, encourages the interpreter to verify 
the adoption of more effective solutions to stem the phenomenon of over-
indebtedness. In fact, as will be shown, Italy provides for ad hoc rules on 
consumer's over-indebtedness. However, this legislation seems to provide 
forms of subsequent protection (ex post protection instruments) rather than 
preventative measures (ex ante protection instruments). Moreover, it does 
not extend, at least explicitly, these remedies to the individual debtor who is 
not a consumer. This gives rise to two problems: the problem of verifying 
whether there is, preventively, a duty for the lender to select consumers on 
the basis of their financial capacity; and the problem of understanding 
whether there is a possibility for the honest, but unfortunate, debtor (even if 
not a consumer), to justify his/her default, assigning liability to the lender. 
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That is why comparative analysis helps also to outline possible interpretative 
solutions in legal systems, such as the Italian, in which the current regulations 
appear unclear. In this respect, the cases of the United States and 
Switzerland, where the principle of improvident credit extension is most 
strongly felt, will be examined. Furthermore, European Union legislation, 
which seems to refer to the responsible lending problem, will be analyzed. 
II. THE COMPARATIVE STUDY: THE CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY MODEL 
AND ITS CONSERVATIVE TREND 
The US model is illustrative of the debtor-oriented system, with its emphasis 
on offering the debtor in financial distress the opportunity to make a fresh start 
in life.10 Consumer default is seen as a natural event affecting anyone, 
regardless of whether or not he/she is an entrepreneur, who acts as a 'homo 
oeconomicus',11 and for this reason merits the opportunity to reacquire his/her 
social dignity so as to be able to re-enter the consumer circuit and feed the 
demand for goods.12 
Title XI of the United States Code (the so-called Bankruptcy Code) 
establishes various crisis settlement processes, which may be grouped into 
two basic categories: liquidation procedures on the one hand, and 
composition with creditors procedures on the other. The former type 
(Chapter 7) involves the entrustment of the debtor's assets to a trustee 
appointed to sell the assets and distribute the proceeds from the sale among 
the creditors. The latter type (Chapter 13) is based on the formulation of a 
plan for the settlement of liabilities within a given period of time. Both 
categories are characterized by the concept of discharge: in the first case, 
except for a number of exceptions, unpaid debts are immediately cancelled 
                                                 
10 This principle goes back a long way: it first appeared in the ruling in Hardy v. Fothergill 
(1888), 13 App. Cas. 351, 367, mentioned by Guido Rossi (ed), Il fallimento nel diritto 
Americano (Cedam 1956) 144, footnote 40. 
11 Stefano Rodotà (ed), Dal soggetto alla persona (Editoriale Scientifica 2007), 22, 
according to whom (also) the consumer – the stereotypical non-business debtor – 
lives in (and interacts with) a market dimension of production and consumption. 
12 The central role played in the North American system by the idea that each individual 
has the right to fail and to be given the opportunity to start again is pointed out in Jay 
W. Ungerman, 'Discharge: the prime mover of Bankruptcy' [1962] Journal of the 
National Association of Referees in Bankruptcy 85 1962 326. 
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(discharged) after the proceeds from the sale of the assets have been 
distributed among the debtor's creditors;13 in the second case, the discharge 
of debts is the final outcome of the implementation of the aforementioned 
plan. 
In this way, the bankruptcy of an individual debtor is perceived as an 
ambivalent instrument. On the one hand, it serves to distribute the burden of 
insolvency through a collective procedure, in which all the creditors' claims 
must be evaluated as a whole and the losses involved shared out fairly. On the 
other hand, it amplifies the value of the debtor's assets, given that the 
involvement of the group of creditors has the effect of maximizing the price 
to be achieved through enforcement proceedings. In this model, which serves 
the market well, the aim of permitting the debtor to reacquire his/her 
purchasing power rapidly is of key importance, in that it underlies the belief 
that by doing so, credit and consumption will be promoted and encouraged. 
However, in order to avoid opportunistic behavior when admitting (albeit 
only partially) creditors' claims, the courts may reject applications for 
admission to insolvency proceedings should the debtor behave in a 
contestable manner towards the creditors.14 Furthermore, in deference to the 
promulgation of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer 
Protection Act (BAPCPA) of 2005, a means test has been introduced: a 
debtor may not have recourse to the procedure referred to in Chapter 7, and 
thus to the immediate discharge that follows from sale of the debtor's assets, 
when the debtor's income is higher than the average in the State in which 
he/she resides. In this case, he/she must necessarily have recourse to the 
procedure referred to in Chapter 13, whereby, on the contrary, bankruptcy 
                                                 
13 Those debts included in the peremptory list provided for by Sec. 523 of Chapter 5, 
cannot be discharged: these include, among others, domestic support obligations, 
certain tax liabilities, debts deriving from fraud, misappropriation or theft, debts 
incurred when the debtor willfully causes harm to another or damage to another's 
property, and debts deriving from fines and other pecuniary penalties. For a broad 
overview of the various categories, see Lara Modica (ed), Profili giuridici del 
sovraindebitamento (Jovene 2012) 323. 
14 As expressed in Sec. 707 of Chapter 7 following the amendment of the original wording 
of the 2005 reform. 
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discharge is only permitted following implementation of the debt 
restructuring plan.  
It cannot be denied that in the USA, which for a long time has been 
dominated by the ideological monopoly of pro-debtor arguments, taken on 
board by progressive bankruptcy scholars, persistent discordant voices have 
emerged that have been strongly supported by conservative bankruptcy 
scholarship.15 Evidence of this lies in the fact that the aforementioned 
measures have recently led to a (partial) rethinking of the rule of bankruptcy 
discharge, in an attempt to (re)convert it from a 'safe harbor' for any debtor, to 
its original purpose as a 'safety net' for the 'honest, but unfortunate, debtor'.16 In 
short, the system remains debtor-oriented, because it is typically aimed at 
facilitating a fresh start and a rapid reintegration of the debtor into the 
economic activity, thanks especially to the discharge tool. However, the 
described novelties reduce the scope of the system. 
The position of the United Kingdom, although also characterized by favor 
debitoris, has nevertheless always been a more restrictive one in terms of 
benefits afforded to debtors. The Insolvency Act and the Insolvency Rules, 
                                                 
15 According to the pro-creditors school of thought, debtors' awareness of the fact that 
they can easily have recourse to the institution of bankruptcy discharge, constitutes 
one of the main reasons for consumers' over-indebtedness, creating a situation of 
moral hazard. See Todd J. Zwicki, 'An Economic Analysis of the Consumer 
Bankruptcy Crisis' [2005] Northwestern University Law Review 1464, which places 
a critical focus on the distortional effects of an interpretation of discharge as a means 
of financial planning. For a reconstruction of the progressive/conservative dualism, 
see among others, Giacomo Rojas Elgueta, 'L'esdebitazione del debitore civile: una 
rilettura del rapporto civil law-common law' [2012] Banca, borsa, titoli di credito I 
314. 
16 This ideological shift is underlined in Rojas Elgueta (n 15), 324, where the author 
nevertheless states that using the instruments of behavioral law and economics, the 
dichotomy in this regard between the common law system and the civil law system is 
weakening. With regard to the expansion of the concept of 'unfortunate', which was 
initially related to the realm of the intervening impossibility of meeting one's 
obligations for reasons beyond the debtor's control, see, on the other hand, Douglas 
G. Baird, 'Discharge, Waiver, and the Behavioral Undercurrents of Debtor-Creditor 
Law' [2006] University of Chicago Law Review 17, who, in emphasizing the gradual 
decline of the rule of personal responsibility, generally linked to the question of 
blame, remarks that: 'every debtor in dire financial straits is unfortunate'. 
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with regard to the bankruptcy of individual and business debtors, similarly 
provide for an insolvency procedure and also for an alternative procedure, 
aimed at the stipulation of an individual voluntary arrangement (IVA). This 
arrangement can result in – under the supervision of a nominee (generally 
represented by an Insolvency Practitioner) and subject to an agreement with 
the creditors representing at least 75% of a debtor's payables – settlement of 
debt exposure, automatically binding all unsecured creditors to the 
aforementioned agreement. In the event of bankruptcy, on the other hand, 
the debtor loses the disposability of his/her assets, which are entrusted to the 
Official Receiver, first of all, and then to the Trustee. Discharge may be 
applied by the party in question or may be triggered automatically after a year 
has elapsed following the opening of bankruptcy proceedings, provided that 
the debtor has not been convicted for bankruptcy offences and is not in 
breach of any obligations pending the proceedings.17 
Furthermore, the 2007 Tribunals Courts and Enforcement Act, which 
actually came into force in April 2009, introduced Debt Relief Orders 
providing for automatic discharge at the end of a simplified administrative 
bankruptcy procedure reserved for individuals possessing no assets, and 
having debts of no more than £15,000. In this way, a solution giving 
preferential treatment to 'small' debtors is accepted. 
This enables a way to deal differently with distinct types of debtors. In other 
words, without specifically providing rules for consumer over-indebtedness, 
the United Kingdom offers differentiated solutions according to the size of 
the debt and the assets owned. This solution can be affected regardless of the 
debtor's consumer status. In this way, more attention is paid to protecting 
the debtor, regardless of the role he plays in a market logic. 
                                                 
17 For a detailed historical survey of English bankruptcy, see Ian P. H. Duffy, 'English 
Bankrupts' [1980] American Journal of Legal History 283, which underlines how, 
unlike in the North American system, the granting of the benefit of discharge in 
English law has always been subject to thorough judicial control.  
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III. THE CONSUMER DEBT ADJUSTMENT MODEL AND ITS PROGRESSIVE 
TREND 
The aforementioned systems are distinguished from the systems of mainland 
Europe, which are traditionally creditor-oriented. However, as will be 
explained shortly, over time these systems have also weakened the profiles 
characterizing the creditor-oriented model, taking into account some of the 
demands favorable to debtors. 
Without neglecting the gradual watering-down of the original features of the 
creditor-oriented model in recent years, the main difference between this 
model and the consumer bankruptcy model is the traditional codification of 
a system of the debtor's unlimited financial liability. In fact, the principle 
whereby the debtor's assets constitute a general guarantee for the creditor, 
places the emphasis on the need to fulfill obligations insofar as possible, thus 
rendering discharge theoretically incompatible with the idea that all of the 
debtor's assets, including future assets, can be used to satisfy creditors' 
claims.18 
Therefore, the creditor-oriented system generally comprises – albeit with the 
differences characterizing the heterogeneous rules in force in the different 
countries – the judicial and extra-judicial renegotiation of debts with 
creditors, in view of the approval of a global repayment plan, where a key role 
is played by advisory and intermediation services. The institution of 
discharge, in the main countries of mainland Europe, is not always available 
to debtors, and when it is available its application is designed for a different 
purpose, namely, to rehabilitate the debtor in order to get him/her to meet 
his/her obligations. In other words, the institution of discharge is used to 
encourage the debtor to cooperate with the procedure and to comply with 
                                                 
18 With regard to the historical origins, seen from a comparative viewpoint, of the 
principle of unlimited financial liability, see Andrea Zoppini, 'Autonomia e 
separazione del patrimonio, nella prospettiva dei patrimoni separati della società per 
azioni' [2002] Rivista di diritto civile I 552. 
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the plan, in order to benefit from the 'reward' of freedom from remaining 
debts. The fresh start is thus replaced by the earned start.19 
This approach is clearly visible in Spain, where the rules have been brought 
together, and where just one legal procedure, called concurso, governs the 
default of debtors (both individual and business debtors), regardless of the 
choice of sub-procedure, be it liquidatión or convenio, it does not result in 
discharge. The cooperative debtor who has freely applied for admission to 
the procedure is 'rewarded' simply by the rule that enables that debtor to 
preserve the possession and administration of his/her assets.20 Upon closure 
of the concurso, due to the insufficient entity of the debtor's assets, 'el deudor 
quederá responsabile del pago de los creditos restantes' (the debtor is responsible for 
the payment of the remaining claims).21 
France, on the other hand, appears more susceptible to progressive 
influences. Actually, French legislation gives a key role to an external body 
responsible for administering the procedure.22 It started from rules that were 
originally based on respect for private autonomy, as a result of which the 
courts were encouraged to impose, upon those creditors who had originally 
rejected this choice during the assisted renegotiation procedure, the plan 
drawn up by the Commission de surendettement des particuliers. In that context, 
the room for maneuver was limited to certain aspects of the original 
obligation (payment extensions, the reduction or elimination of interest 
payments, the provision of a deadline, within a given range, for the concession 
                                                 
19 Udo Reifner, Johanna Kiesilainedn, Nik Huls, and Helga Springeneer (eds), 
Consumer over-indebtedness and consumer law in the European Union – Final 
report to the European Commission, 2003, 167 <www.ecri.eu>. 
20 See art. 40 of the Ley Orgánica Concursal 22/2003. 
21 See art. 178, paragraph 2, of the Ley Orgánica Concursal 22/2003: see Pablo Gutierrez 
de Cabiedes (ed), El sobreendeudamiento doméstico: prevención y solución (Cizur Menor 
2009), 60, which criticises the tendency to perpetuate over-indebtedness, which is 
represented as a 'torre del deudor'. Surprisingly, in the case of legal persons, paragraph 
3 of the same provision establishes, on the contrary, 'la cancelaciόn de su inscripciόn en 
los registros público' following liquidation. 
22 In Belgium and Luxembourg, an administrative phase is also provided for, during 
which the financial distress is resolved by means of an amicable settlement. On the 
similarities with the French model, see Pellecchia (n 1) 130. 
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of such measures).23 Starting from there, France has shifted to a system that 
takes care not to burden debtors and their families excessively.24 Although 
observing the essential nature of the administrative phase leading up to the 
formulation of the Plan conventionnel de redressement, the French courts have 
significant discretionary powers when it comes to establishing which revenue 
is to remain available to the debtor in order that he/she may continue to live 
in a manner in keeping with human dignity. The courts, as well as the 
commissions, may establish whether the over-indebted individual merits (or 
not) admission to the extraordinary procedure of rétablissement personnel: if the 
situation is deemed to be 'irrémédiablement compromise' (irretrievably 
compromised) and there is a total absence of actifs, the debtor may in fact 
obtain immediate discharge.25 
In Germany too, debtors (both individuals and businesses) are asked to go 
through a phase of debt renegotiation, which they are free to agree to. In the 
event of a negative outcome, this may lead to a simplified judicial 
composition with creditors, or to a simplified insolvency procedure with the 
assignment to an official receiver for a given period of time of seizable 
income.26 In accordance with the plan, the debtor must undertake to try to 
keep a job, and to cooperate with the official receiver, in order not to lose the 
benefit of discharge otherwise guaranteed to the debtor 
(Wohlverhaltensphase).27 
                                                 
23 See Law no. 1989-1010 (the Loi Neiertz). 
24 See the changes introduced by Law no. 2003-710 (the Loi Borloo) and by Law no. 2010-
737 (the Loi Lagarde). 
25 Frédéric Ferrière and Pierre-Laurent Chatain (eds), Surendettement des particuliers 
(Dalloz 2006) 240 ff., point out that the aforementioned discretionary power has 
been widely exercised in favor of debtors in recent years. 
26 See the Insolvenzordnung, amended on several occasions in order to broaden the range 
of debtors' non-seizable revenues and assets. Details of the original version of this 
German insolvency law can be found in Dörte Busch, 'Current Reform Efforts of 
German Consumer Insolvency Law and the Discharge of Residual Debts' [2006] 
German Law Journal 6. On the current formulation of the law, see Claus Ott – Mihai 
Vuia, in Münchener Kommentar zur InsO, 3 Aufl., 2014, München, §§ 304-314 InsO. 
27 In Austria, whose legislation is very similar to that of Germany, residual debts are 
automatically discharged following payment by the debtor of the costs of the 
procedure and of half the unsecured debts. However, should the debtor fail to pay the 
costs of the procedure in full, and fail to pay at least 10% of unsecured debts, the 
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In Denmark and Sweden, on the other hand, not only the subsequent 
granting of discharge, but also the prior admission to the procedure for 
composition with creditors, are subject to the court's verification of an 
independent administrative authority (in the first case), and of the causes of 
the consumer's over-indebtedness (in the second case). As a rule, these 
systems aim to prevent the positive effects of the procedure benefiting 
persons who have acted in a financially irresponsible manner with clear 
speculative intentions and taking on disproportionate risks compared to 
their financial capacities.28 
IV. ITALY'S SPECIAL SOLUTION 
A quick view of the comparative analysis of the question reveals a picture 
where, in terms of the (initially radically different) ways in which different 
legal systems have treated individual debtors in financial distress, a series of 
reciprocal influences have more recently emerged. On the one hand, 
traditionally debtor-oriented countries (such as the United States) currently 
have mechanisms that make it less easy than before to enjoy the benefit of 
discharge. Such a change demonstrates the influence of those studies that 
deny the (totally) positive effect of discharge-oriented legislation on the rate 
of increase of self-employment, noting that the easier access to discharge is, 
the higher the cost of credit granted by banks becomes.29 On the other hand, 
traditionally creditor-oriented countries (such as France, Spain and 
Germany), whose systems are based on the centrality of the principle of 
                                                 
courts may decide, at their own discretion, whether to grant discharge all the same, 
or whether to further extend (no more than twice) the deadline set by the payment 
plan. 
28 According to Denmark's Konkurs lov, the court must reject the settlement plan 
proposed by the debtor if the debts were incurred: a) at a time when there was no 
realistic likelihood of such debts being repaid; b) in the presence of a 
disproportionate risk in relation to the debtor's financial capacity; c) in view of 
admission to the procedure for settlement of financial distress. Similarly, Swedish law 
(Skuldsaneringslagen (2006:548)) requires the independent administrative authority to 
evaluate the reasonableness of the debt restructuring plan. 
29 Song Han – Wenli Li, 'Fresh start or Head start? The Effects of Filing for Personal 
Bankruptcy on Work Effort' [2007] Journal of Financial Services Research 123; 
Kartik Athreya, 'Fresh start or head start? Uniform bankruptcy exemptions and 
welfare' [2006] Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 30 2051. 
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unlimited financial responsibility, have taken a more liberal attitude towards 
the discharge of the individual debtor. 
The Italian system is based on the diversification of the legal treatment of 
individual and business insolvency. The opportunity or rather, the legitimacy 
of this regulatory choice has been the subject of lengthy debate also at the 
constitutional level.30 Only recently this system has enacted legislation, 
which has introduced special procedures for the settlement of 'the over-
indebtedness distress' of those persons that cannot be subjected to the 
insolvency procedures provided for by Bankruptcy Law. In other words, the 
legislation in question has been concerned with regulating the composition 
of the crisis of the individual or business debtor, who is not a bankrupt 
commercial entrepreneur.31 
An initial evaluation of the situation may be proffered here following the 
legislative decision to proceed in this direction. Within the framework of the 
basic approach adopted, the distinction, at the regulatory level, between the 
business debtor's incapacity to fulfill his/her obligations and the individual 
debtor's incapacity to do likewise, has been codified by Italian law. 
Furthermore, the notion of 'sovraindebitamento' (over-indebtedness) has been 
introduced, at the factual level, alongside the previously-recognized concepts 
of 'insolvenza' (insolvency) and 'crisi' (financial distress). In other words, 
Italian legislation has not only kept civil insolvency and commercial 
insolvency separate, but – in the context of the former – it has also introduced 
a notion of crisis, 'personalized' for the debtor that cannot be declared 
bankrupt. This choice is also confirmed in the draft reform under discussion. 
V. THE 'ISOLATION' AND 'SPLITTING' OF THE OVER-INDEBTED, NON-
BANKRUPTABLE DEBTOR  
As pointed out above, Italian Law no. 3/2012 has conformed with the 
traditional distinction between individual and business insolvency. In doing 
so, however, it has aimed not only (and not so much) at 'isolating' the case of 
the non-bankruptable debtor, by establishing a special (diverse) system for 
the resolution of financial distress, but has also (and above all) been 
                                                 
30 In this regard, see Section 5 below. 
31 For the definition of this figure see Section 5 below (footnote 30). 
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concerned with 'splitting' the case in question into two parts, with 
consequences in terms of the regulation of such cases. In fact, the distinction 
between the figure of the business debtor excluded from insolvency procedures, 
referred to in the Bankruptcy Law, and that of the consumer has been 
introduced. In particular, Article 6 of that law distinguishes the debtor who is 
not subject to insolvency proceedings (so-called 'non-bankruptable debtor') from 
the consumer. The former is the debtor who is a non-commercial entrepreneur 
or, even though he is a commercial entrepreneur, does not exceed any of the 
thresholds established by Article 1 of the Bankruptcy Law.32 The latter is the 
individual debtor (natural person), who has undertaken obligations 
exclusively for purposes outside his trade, business or profession. The 
'regulatory adjustment' performed in this way is of considerable importance.  
As mentioned above, the decision to treat the defaulting business debtor and 
individual debtor differently is not new: in fact, this option can be found as 
far back as the business codes of 1865 and 1882 and was already included in the 
1942 Civil Code and in the Bankruptcy Law of that same period. 
Furthermore, more than once it has been brought to the attention of the 
Constitutional Court, which has reaffirmed the legitimacy of the distinction. 
Firstly, when pointing out that no violation of the principle of equality has 
been committed, 'giacché lo svolgere attività commerciale organizzata ad 
impresa costituisce una situazione obiettivamente diversa da quella di chi 
svolge un'attività di diverso tipo, e non è irrazionale l'aver limitato alla prima 
la disciplina concorsuale, né sono arbitrari i motivi di tale limitazione' ('since 
carrying out a business activity as a firm constitutes an objectively different 
situation from that of a person carrying out an activity of another kind, and it 
is not irrational to have limited insolvency law to the former; nor are the 
                                                 
32 Pursuant to Art. 1 of the Bankruptcy Act, commercial entrepreneurs who prove that 
they fulfil the following conditions are not subject to the provisions on bankruptcy 
and a composition with creditors:  
a) in the three financial years prior to the date of filing the application for bankruptcy 
or from the start of the activity, whichever is the shorter, they have had assets totaling 
no more than € 300,000 in total per year; 
b) have achieved, in any way, in the three financial years prior to the date of filing the 
application for bankruptcy or from the start of the activity, whichever is the shorter, 
gross revenues for a total annual amount not exceeding € 200,000; 
c) have an amount of debts, including those not yet due, not exceeding € 500,000.  
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grounds for such a limitation to be considered of an arbitrary nature').33 
Subsequently, specifying that the arguments underlying the diversification of 
legal treatment 'sfuggono al giudizio di conformità ai principi costituzionali 
(…) per rientrare nell'area di scelte proprie del legislatore' ('do not come 
within the scope of any judgment of compliance with constitutional 
principles (…) but fall within the scope of the legislator's own decisions').34 
Similarly, there is nothing new about the decision to provide for a category of 
non-bankruptable entrepreneurs, thus removing them from the scope of the 
application of insolvency procedures: in fact, although remaining within the 
context of business insolvency, the legislator has chosen, from the drafting of 
the original wording of the Bankruptcy Law, to identify thresholds below 
which it is not possible to go bankrupt or be subject to other judicial 
proceedings provided for therein. Furthermore, the Constitutional Court 
has also given its opinion on the legitimacy of such a distinction, pointing out 
that 'anche nel configurare questa discriminazione nell'ambito della 
categoria dei commercianti, la legge ha tenuto presente una diversità 
obiettiva di situazioni, in relazione alle dimensioni dell'impresa, 
diversamente valutando l'interesse pubblico ad applicare la legislazione 
fallimentare al loro stato di insolvenza' ('also in establishing this distinction 
within the category of businesses, the Law has kept in mind the objective 
diversity of situations, in terms of the size of businesses, assessing differently 
the public interest in applying bankruptcy law to their state of insolvency 
depending on this criterion'), and reiterating the view that 'l'esclusione dal 
fallimento del piccolo imprenditore (…) si basa su una valutazione di politica 
economico-sociale e di opportunità giuridica, che non può essere ripetuta in 
questa sede' ('the small business' exclusion from bankruptcy (…) is based on 
an evaluation in terms of socio-economic policy and legal appropriateness 
that cannot be repeated here').35  
On the contrary, the option to provide for a variety of different procedures 
for the resolution of cases of financial distress (debt-restructuring 
agreements, restructured repayment schedules, sale of assets), differentiated 
according to the nature of the non-bankruptable debtor, seems original, 
                                                 
33 Italian Constitutional Court, 16 June 1970, decision no. 94 [1970] Foro italiano I 1857.  
34 Italian Constitutional Court, 27 July 1982, decision no. 145 [1982] Foro italiano I 3006. 
35 See Italian Constitutional Court, 16 June 1970, decision no. 94, op. cit.  
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taking as the selection criterion not the reference to the 'common' individual 
debtor, but to the consumer. Indeed, while the insolvency procedure can (or 
must) be triggered by (or in the presence of) any non-bankruptable debtor 
(including consumers), following rules and methods of implementation that 
do not provide for any diversification in legal terms, the debt-restructuring 
agreement and the restructured repayment schedule, on the contrary, are 
subjectively separate in terms of the submission of the application and in 
terms of approval thereof.36 Italian Law no. 3/2012, as amended by Italian 
Decree Law no. 179/2012 (the Decreto Crescita) and its corresponding 
converting law, establishes that the 'over-indebted debtor' may propose to 
creditors, with the aid of those bodies appointed to resolve the situation of 
financial distress, a debt restructuring and claim satisfaction agreement based 
on a plan. This plan, having ensured due payment of the holders of non-
seizable receivables, must foresee deadlines and means of payment, possible 
guarantees and means for the sale of assets if necessary, or for the direct 
entrustment of assets to an official receiver. The 'over-indebted consumer', 
on the other hand, may indeed propose an agreement or plan to creditors that 
foresees the restructuring of debt obligations and the satisfaction of claims, 
as described above, but unlike the 'over-indebted debtor', the consumer may 
do so in any form, including through the transfer of future receivables. Should 
the debtor's assets and income be insufficient to guarantee the feasibility of 
the agreement or the plan, the proposal may be underwritten by one or more 
third parties who agree to the contribution of sufficient income or assets to 
guarantee implementation thereof. This proposal must be accompanied by a 
detailed report drawn up by the body responsible for the resolution of the 
situation of distress in question, containing, among other things, details of 
the causes of indebtedness, and of the consumer's diligence in voluntarily 
taking on the obligations, together with a report on the consumer's solvency 
over the last five years. Furthermore, whereas for the purposes of approval, 
the 'over-indebted debtor' must reach an agreement with the (unsecured) 
creditors representing at least 60% of all amounts due, the 'over-indebted 
                                                 
36 It should be pointed out, in fact, that liquidation may also be triggered upon the 
issuing of an order transforming the procedure for the resolution of distress, based on 
a debt-restructuring agreement or a restructured payment schedule, in the case of any 
annulment, revocation or termination of the former, or in the event that the effects 
of approval of the latter cease, or that the latter is revoked or terminated. 
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consumer' is only subject to an assessment by the court concerning the 
feasibility of the schedule and the merits of the debtor's conduct leading up 
to distress.37 The notification of the proposal to all creditors is therefore not 
designed for voting purposes, but only for challenges that there may be to the 
advisability of the plan. 
The discharge of residual unpaid debts to insolvency creditors, subject to 
certain important objective and subjective limitations, has been introduced. 
The objective limitation is that the benefit in question is restricted to cases 
of liquidation of assets. In terms of subjective limitations, the discharge only 
operates if: a) the individual debtor has cooperated with the regular, effective 
carrying out of the procedure; b) he/she has not benefited from any other 
discharge in the previous eight years; c) he/she has carried out an activity 
producing income in keeping with that person's skills, or in any case has 
looked for a job and has not refused any proposed jobs without good cause; 
and d) the creditors in title and for reasons predating the order opening the 
liquidation procedure have had their claims satisfied, at least in part. At the 
same time, based on the evaluation, in terms of the award of the benefit, 
discharge shall be excluded in cases where over-indebtedness is the 
consequence of recourse to negligent, disproportionate credit in view of the 
individual's financial capacities, or when the debtor, in the five previous 
years, has defrauded creditors. 
VI. THE KEY ROLE OF THE CONSUMER AS A REMEDY FOR MARKET 
FAILURE: POSSIBLE INTERPRETATIVE AND EXTENSIVE SOLUTIONS  
So far, the analysis has shown that many of the countries mentioned have 
protective measures in place in the event of over-indebtedness, but only a few 
(such as Sweden, Denmark and Italy) pay attention to the causes of over-
indebtedness. Furthermore, it seems that the common feature of the latter 
countries mentioned is that the over-indebted consumer is granted ex post 
protection instruments and not also that of preventing the phenomenon, by 
                                                 
37 According to art. 12-bis, paragraph 3, of Italian Law no. 3/2012, in fact, the court must 
exclude – for the purposes of approval – that the consumer has taken on financial 
obligations with no reasonable prospect of meeting those obligations, or that the 
consumer has negligently caused over-indebtedness, also by recourse to credit out of 
all proportion to that person's financial capacity. 
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providing ex ante protection instruments. Indeed, it seems appropriate to 
consider that the consumer may not be reasonably prudent. Therefore, the 
consumer could be unable to make informed choices that would protect him 
from the risk of over-indebtedness. From this point of view, and overturning 
the perspective of the creditor, there is a pressing need to make, with clear 
rules, the lender responsible. In other words, it would be desirable for the 
legislation to seek to prevent irrational decisions from being taken by lenders. 
According to the responsible lending approach, the lender should be obliged 
to select the applications for financing, evaluating the most suitable product 
for the applicant. In addition, the lender should assess the consumer's credit 
rating, in relation to the ability to repay the loan, the level of debt already in 
place and the risk of over-indebtedness. 
In the Italian legal system, the regulation of the sector (Consolidated 
Banking Law, art. 120-undecies and 124-bis), although providing for the 
evaluation of the consumer's credit rating, does not allow for interpretations 
that may point to an obligation, on the part of professional lenders, to refrain 
from granting credit to persons who are already financially fragile. In fact, the 
term 'credit rating' generally means the objective, present capacity to repay 
debts, measured in terms of income, of the assets that creditors can claim, 
and of past repayment history.38 Such a provision thus refers to the precept of 
sound, prudent management designed to ensure the stability of the banking 
system rather than to meet the need to regulate demand for credit so as to 
                                                 
38 For this interpretation, see, Alessandro Simionato, 'Prime note in tema di valutazione 
del merito creditizio del consumatore nella direttiva 2008/48/CE' [2010] Rivista di 
diritto bancario 183; Enrico Caterini, 'Controllo del credito, tutela del risparmio e 
adeguatezza nel finanziamento "finalizzato"' in Vito Rizzo – Enrico Caterini – Luca 
Di Nella – Lorenzo Mezzasoma (eds), La tutela del consumatore nelle posizioni di debito e 
credito (Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane 2010), 49; Gustavo Minervini , 'Il 
sovraindebitamento del consumatore e la direttiva 2008/48/CE', in Vito Rizzo – 
Enrico Caterini – Luca Di Nella – Lorenzo Mezzasoma (eds), La tutela del consumatore 
nelle posizioni di debito e credito, op. cit., 65; Serafina Rosaria Larocca, 'L'obbligo di 
verifica del merito creditizio del consumatore', in Vito Rizzo, Enrico Caterini, Luca 
Di Nella, Lorenzo Mezzasoma (eds), La tutela del consumatore nelle posizioni di debito e 
credito, op. cit., 233. 
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safeguard the financed consumer.39 On the contrary, Italian Law no. 3/2012, 
as amended, seems to highlight the problem of the debtor, who is in a state of 
over-indebtedness due to events beyond his control. 
The question then arises as to how to interpret this apparent dichotomy: is 
there a duty for the lender to select the consumers on the basis of their ability 
to perform and is there the possibility for the honest, but unfortunate, debtor 
to justify his/her default, assigning liability to the lender? In this case too, 
comparative analysis helps to outline possible interpretative solutions in legal 
systems, such as the Italian one, in which the current regulations appear 
unclear. The US doctrine has affirmed, for years, the principle of improvident 
credit extension.40 This refers to a situation in which it is not reasonable, on 
the basis of information already in the possession of the creditor, to expect 
the debtor to be able to repay the loan and meet the required deadlines. Thus, 
the debtor could justify his/her default or take action to have his/her 
obligation extinguished or, in any case, the part exceeding the reasonable 
level of credit. Although this theory has been rarely considered by judges, it 
is worth remembering the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act, whose title XIV is entitled Mortgage Reform and Anti-
Predatory Lending Act. This title imposes strict rules on the disbursement of 
loans. 
The Swiss Loi Federale sur le credit à la consummation (artt. 22-31) requires 
lenders to consult a database with information on borrowers in advance to 
assess their ability to assume additional obligations and to avoid over-
                                                 
39 Some authors suggest this interpretation: see Aurelio Mirone, 'L'evoluzione della 
disciplina sulla trasparenza bancaria in tempo di crisi: istruzioni di vigilanza, credito 
al consumo, commissioni di massimo scoperto' [2010] Banca, borsa, titoli di credito 
I 592; Antonella Antonucci , 'Credito al consumo e zone limitrofe: una scheda di 
lettura del d. legis. n. 141 del 2010' [2011] Nuova giurisprudenza civile commentata II 
301, according to whom the Consolidated Banking Act 'has partly failed to meet 
expectations regarding the safeguarding of borrowers, by introducing, on the 
contrary – in the form of the provision concerning credit-worthiness – special 
protection for lenders, enabling them to utilise structured ways of managing credit 
risk'; Modica (n 14) 239 .  
40 Vern Countryman, 'Improvident Credit Extension: A New Legal Concept Aborning' 
[1975] Main Law Review 23. 
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indebtedness as a result of a consumer credit contract. If they do not do so, 
they risk losing their credit. 
Also in the context of the European Union, there seems to be some (albeit 
modest and indirect) reference to the responsible lending issue. In particular, 
the issue was mentioned in recital 26 of Directive 2008/48/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council, which states that  
'Member States should take appropriate measures to promote responsible 
practices during all phases of the credit relationship, taking into account the 
specific features of their credit market. Those measures may include, for 
instance, the provision of information to, and the education of, consumers, 
including warnings about the risks attaching to default on payment and to 
over-indebtedness. In the expanding credit market, in particular, it is 
important that creditors should not engage in irresponsible lending or give 
out credit without prior assessment of creditworthiness, and the Member 
States should carry out the necessary supervision to avoid such behavior and 
should determine the necessary means to sanction creditors in the event of 
their doing so'. 
Similarly, recital 29 of Directive 2014/17/EU of the European Parliament and 
of the Council ('on credit agreements for consumers relating to residential 
immovable property') states that  
'in order to increase the ability of consumers to make informed decisions for 
themselves about borrowing and managing debt responsibly, Member States 
should promote measures to support the education of consumers in relation 
to responsible borrowing and debt management in particular relating to 
mortgage credit agreements. It is particularly important to provide guidance 
for consumers taking out mortgage credit for the first time. In that regard, 
the Commission should identify examples of best practices to facilitate the 
further development of measures to enhance consumers' financial 
awareness'. 
Consequently, Article 6 provides that  
'Member States shall promote measures that support the education of 
consumers in relation to responsible borrowing and debt management, in 
particular in relation to mortgage credit agreements. Clear and general 
information on the credit granting process is necessary in order to guide 
consumers, especially those who take out a mortgage credit for the first 
time'.  
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Article 14 states that  
'Member States shall ensure that the creditor and, where applicable, the credit 
intermediary or appointed representative, provides the consumer with the 
personalized information needed to compare the credits available on the market, 
assess their implications and make an informed decision on whether to conclude a 
credit agreement'.  
 
Article 16 lays down that  
'Member States shall ensure that creditors and, where applicable, credit 
intermediaries or appointed representatives provide adequate explanations 
to the consumer on the proposed credit agreements and any ancillary 
services, in order to place the consumer in a position enabling him to assess 
whether the proposed credit agreements and ancillary services are adapted 
to his needs and financial situation'.  
Article 18 establishes that  
'Member States shall ensure that, before concluding a credit agreement, the 
creditor makes a thorough assessment of the consumer's creditworthiness. 
That assessment shall take appropriate account of factors relevant to 
verifying the prospect of the consumer to meet his obligations under the 
credit agreement'. 
In the light of this brief investigation, it appears that the Italian legislator 
wished to intervene with tools of subsequent protection (ex post protection 
instruments) for so-called 'passive over-indebtedness' with a kind of selective 
discharge of residual debt, while neglecting, on the creditor's side, the 
possibility of endorsing, preventatively (ex ante protection instruments), the 
obligation to offer select borrowing facilities to 'deserving' debtors.41  
In any case, the new decision (made in the 'Decreto Crescita') to identify a 
selection principle of the various procedures for the composition of financial 
distress caused by over-indebtedness from a subjective viewpoint, making the 
consumer the paradigm of the non-bankruptable individual debtor, would 
seem to suggest the view, as previously mentioned, that the most worrying 
                                                 
41 Pellecchia (n 1) 226 ff., enthusiastically greets in the Decreto Crescita bis the 
introduction of the concept of passive over-indebtedness, meaning the situation of 
over-indebtedness suffered by the 'honest, but unfortunate' debtor perceived as a 
victim of events beyond his/her control and independent of his/her will. 
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aspect, in terms of legislative policy, is the market and its state of health.42 By 
accepting the argument that consumers' rights are business rights, given that 
consumers live and count as such within a market context, it is 
understandable that the legislator's choice was justified by the need to 
encourage economic growth, through lending support to consumer demand. 
In other words, if one starts from the premise that the consumer, as homo 
oeconomicus, expresses him/herself 'in the sphere of production and 
consumption, and thus in the market',43 the provisions introduced appear to 
be based on a view of over-indebtedness as a market failure, rather than as a 
social problem. Therefore, it would seem that the aforementioned additional 
provisions have diverted the legal profession's attention from the social 
consequences of over-indebtedness to market efficiency and the 
encouragement of consumption. Thus, it comes as no surprise to find that the 
provisions in question only apply, in the productive corporate sphere, to 
innovative start-ups. For these, the legislators have reserved special 
'protective' treatment in order to 'favorire la crescita sostenibile, lo sviluppo 
tecnologico, la nuova imprenditorialità' ('encourage sustainable growth, 
technological development and the new entrepreneurship') so as to 
'contribuire allo sviluppo di una nuova cultura imprenditoriale ed alla 
creazione di un contesto maggiormente favorevole all'innovazione' 
('contribute to the development of a new entrepreneurial culture and the 
creation of an environment fostering greater innovation').44 With this in 
mind, the decision to establish a simplified procedure (such as that of the 
settlement of financial distress caused by over-indebtedness), as an 
alternative to those solutions offered by the Bankruptcy Law, aims to 
'facilitare la ripartenza dello start-upper su nuove iniziative imprenditoriali' 
('facilitate the start-upper's restart through new business projects').45 
                                                 
42 See Section 1 above. 
43 This expression is borrowed from Rodota (n 11) 22. 
44 See art. 25, paragraph 1, of the Decreto Crescita bis. On the essence of innovative start-
ups, see, among others, Monica Cossu, 'Le start-up innovative in forma di società a 
responsabilità illimitata. Profili privatistici' in Mario Campobasso, Vincenzo 
Cariello, Vincenzo Di Cataldo, Fabrizio Guerrera, andAntonella Sciarrone Alibrandi 
(eds), Società, banche, crisi d'impresa. Liber amicorum Pietro Abbadessa (Utet 2014) 1075. 
45 See the preface to the Report illustrating the Decreto Crescita bis. 
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It seems then that the current Italian system adopts a liberal model. In short, 
the legislator is concerned with giving special treatment to the consumer, so 
that he/she can actively return to consumption as soon as possible. However, 
it is possible to observe some, albeit timid, signs of welfare issues. The 
legislator's concern for the consumer's passive over-indebtedness leads to 
believe that the objective of the regulation could also be that of protecting 
the debtor from further risks. This observation could lead to interpretative 
and applicative consequences. 
First of all, the lender's duty to assess the consumer's credit rating may be a 
means of protecting the debtor from insolvency. According to general 
clauses, the duty must be fulfilled fairly and in good faith. It follows that, 
when entering into consumer credit contracts, the lender should acquire all 
the information necessary for an accurate representation of the 
characteristics of the loan.46 In compliance with the rule of pre-contractual 
fairness and good faith, it could be considered that, in the presence of 
negative indications on the consumer's credit rating, the lender who, 
nevertheless, disburses the loan, becomes liable for the damage suffered by 
the debtor. In other words, even in the absence of an express obligation of 
abstention on the part of the lender to grant credit to subjects in precarious 
economic conditions, the interpretation of the current discipline, oriented 
towards welfare issues, could allow us to believe that the creditor can also be 
held responsible for having performed an inappropriate and damaging credit 
contract.47 However, it cannot be denied that it would be preferable if such 
an interpretation was expressed directly by law. 
Secondly, the influence of welfare issues leads us to believe that such a 
regulation can be applied to deal with the over-indebtedness of any individual 
debtor, even if not a consumer, by paying attention to the reasons for the 
financial distress and the merit of the debtor. Accordingly, the described 
                                                 
46 With reference to the function performed, in these cases, by the principle of fairness, 
see Pietro Abbadessa, 'Banca e responsabilità precontrattuale: i doveri di 
informazione', in Salvatore Maccarone – Alessandro Nigro (eds), Funzione bancaria, 
rischio e responsabilità della banca (Milano 1981) 296. 
47 With reference to Italian doctrine and the need for the financial intermediary to 
assess the appropriateness of the consumer's request, see Roberto Natoli (ed), Il 
contratto 'adeguato'. La protezione del cliente nei servizi di credito, di investimento e di 
assicurazione (Giappichelli 2012) 117. 
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framework would become general. Thus, the debtor could be protected from 
unforeseen events and traumatic changes in his/her economic situation, 
regardless of his/her nature as a consumer. In other words, the relevant 
criteria would be only the causes of over-indebtedness and the conduct of the 
debtor, but not his/her role as a consumer. This solution seems to be better 
at treating, also with a view to reducing, the phenomenon of over-
indebtedness. What should matter is that the debtor is diligent and the 
victim of passive over-indebtedness, not the fact that he/she is a consumer. 
VII. THE (RE)AFFIRMATION OF SOCIAL PROBLEMS FROM THE POINT OF 
VIEW OF FUTURE LEGISLATION: CONCLUSIONS AND PROSPECTS DE 
JURE CONDENDO 
The current signs of future legislation indicate that it is likely the reform will 
reinforce the idea that we are moving towards a welfare model. In particular, 
Italian Law no. 155/2017 (art. 9) (an enabling Act permitting the Government 
to pass legislation on the wholesale reform of the rules governing the 
management of business distress and insolvency) establishes that those 
provisions regulating the question of over-indebtedness be reorganized and 
simplified in accordance with certain specific guidelines.48 
More specifically, from the subjective point of view, it requires that: (a) the 
categories of person who may be subject to the procedure, also on the basis 
of a principle of prevalence of the different forms of obligations taken on, be 
specified, including individuals and entities that may not be subject to 
composition with creditors to avoid bankruptcy, or to winding up by the 
court, as well as shareholders with unlimited liability; (b) that legal persons 
also be admitted to the discharge procedure, provided they are not guilty of 
defrauding creditors or of choosing to default on the plan or the agreement. 
From the point of view of merit, it: (a) regulates those solutions aimed at 
promoting the debtor's business continuity, and the manner of his/her 
conversion to the solution of liquidation, if applicable, also when requested 
by the debtor, permitting only liquidation without any discharge, in the event 
that the distress or insolvency is the result of the debtor's bad faith or fraud; 
                                                 
48 The enabling Act was published on 19 October 2017 and submitted with no. 155. On 
November 8, 2018, the outline of the legislative decree introducing the Codice della 
crisi d’impresa e dell’insolvenza was approved, in implementation of Law 155/2017. 
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(b) permits the deserving debtor who cannot offer creditors any interest, to 
be granted discharge of residual debts just once, without prejudice to the 
obligation to pay off such debts within three years should the necessary 
resources materialize; (c) precludes access to the procedure to those persons 
whose debts have already been discharged in the previous five years, or who 
have already benefitted from discharge twice, or in the case of proven fraud. 
From the objective viewpoint of procedural formalities, the following are 
provided for: (a) the introduction of protective measures, albeit of a revocable 
nature, similar to those provided for in composition with creditors; (b) 
acknowledgement of the idea of access to liquidation, even pending 
individual executive procedures, on the part of creditors, and when 
insolvency regards businesses, on the part of the Public Prosecutor; (c) the 
granting of the initiative, also to creditors and the Public Prosecutor, to 
convert the procedure into one of liquidation in cases of fraud or default. 
From the point of view of penalties, it proposes to establish measures 
penalizing creditors who have deliberately contributed towards aggravating 
the situation of indebtedness. 
Despite the provisional character of the submitted act permitting the 
Government to pass legislation, it would appear that the noticeable 
(re)emphasis on the causes of over-indebtedness, and on the debtor's 
diligence, which moreover justifies the appeal – from the category of persons 
subjectable to the procedures referred to in Italian Law no. 3/2012 – not only 
to business debtors in the form of physical persons, but also to those in the 
form of legal entities, is in keeping with the welfare state model. While it is 
true that the aforementioned legislative provisions meet liberal needs, where 
the object of regulation (and of the consequent protection provided) is the 
market, it is also true that, should the foreseen reform of the law governing 
financial distress and insolvency actually follow the guideline principles that 
the bill formulates with regard to the state of over-indebtedness, a series of 
purely social expectations would be met, at least in part. 
It seems that we are moving towards the (re)affirmation of the archetypal 
'honest, but unfortunate, debtor', which at this point may also include not 
only consumers, as well as business enterprises or individual debtors, 
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provided that they are characterized by the involuntary, uncontrollable 
nature of the causes of distress.49 
In this regard, it seems appropriate to reflect – in legislative terms and, then, 
in a de jure condendo analysis – on the possibility of introducing a discipline 
that better embodies the responsible lending approach. This comparative 
study has made it possible to highlight the importance of rules for the 
protection of the debtor, who, blamelessly, relies on the lender's assessment 
of the sustainability of the loan. However, most of the countries regulate ex 
post protection instruments, i.e. they are concerned with remedying a 
situation of already proliferating over-indebtedness. On the contrary, it 
seems that the phenomenon could be better controlled by also taking an ex 
ante protection perspective. It seems appropriate to consider that the debtor 
may not be reasonably prudent. The debtor could be unable to make 
informed choices that would protect him from the risk of over-indebtedness. 
Therefore, it would be desirable for the systems to adopt, in addition to 
precepts on the lender's information duties, clear rules on the obligation of 
abstention on the part of the lender to grant credit to subjects in precarious 
economic conditions and on the liability of the lender for betraying the 
debtor's reliability on the sustainability of the loan. From this perspective, a 
new level of sensitivity would derive with regard to the issue of contracting 
with the insolvent. This would move away from the exclusive protection of 
the creditor against the insolvent debtor to the protection of the debtor 
against the risk of over-indebtedness. In this way, the phenomenon of 
consumer over-indebtedness could be prevented – or at least reduced – 
through a discipline that grants instruments of preventative protection. 
This logic of preventative protection could pave the way for a possible 
compensatory remedy: the debtor, betrayed in his/her reliability on the 
sustainability of the loan, could ask and obtain from the lender compensation 
for the damage suffered.
                                                 
49 The relevance of this viewpoint has been pointed out, albeit in a period prior to the 
presentation of the enabling act in question, by Pellecchia (n 1), 226, who interprets 
the wording of Law 3/2012 as permitting each diligent, innocently over-indebted 
debtor to submit a restructured repayment schedule. 
